A Matter of Size and Generosity:  Assessing the Complex Relation between the Welfare State and Social Capital by Ferragina, Emanuele
 
 
  
 
LIEPP Working Paper 
Decembre 2015, nº43 
Axe “Politiques socio-fiscales”  
 
 
 
A Matter of Size and Generosity:  
Assessing the Complex Relation 
between the Welfare State and 
Social Capital 
 
 
Emanuele Ferragina 
Sciences Po (OSC-CNRS et LIEPP) 
emanuele.ferragina@sciencespo.fr 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.sciencespo.fr/liepp 
© 2015 by the authors. All rights reserved.
 LIEPP Working Paper nº43 
1 
A Matter of Size and Generosity: 
Assessing the Complex Relation between the Welfare 
State and Social Capital 
*
 
 
 
Emanuele Ferragina 
Sciences Po (OSC-CNRS et LIEPP) 
 
Abstract 
Using confirmatory factor analysis and several regression models, 
this paper assesses the relation between different welfare state 
configurations and social capital in 19 European countries over two 
decades. The results suggest that welfare state configurations 
characterized by high degrees of decommodification and restrained 
levels of social spending are associated with higher social capital 
scores. Moreover, the positive relation between decommodification 
and social capital is stronger than the negative association observed 
with social spending. At the theoretical level, on the one hand, the 
findings seem to partially confirm the concern of neoclassical and 
communitarian theorists for the negative correlation between large 
size welfare states and social capital. On the other hand, they support 
the contention of institutional theorists that there is a strong positive 
association between high degrees of welfare state generosity and 
social capital.  
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Introduction 
The article investigates the association between different welfare 
state configurations and social capital over two decades. Is the 
presence of a large and generous welfare state correlated with higher 
social capital scores? Addressing this question is interesting from a 
societal, theoretical and empirical perspective. In an era of 
‗permanent austerity‘ (Pierson 2001) – characterized by a 
considerable amount of reforms (Hemerijck 2013) – it is crucial to 
investigate the evolving relation between the welfare state and 
societal issues. Scholars have often analyzed the welfare state as an 
independent variable of interest, evaluating its association with 
outcomes like inequality, poverty (Esping-Andersen and Myles 
2010), economic performance (Hall and Soskice 2001), and coverage 
of old and new social risks (Ferragina, Seeleib-Kaiser and 
Spreckelsen 2015). In this context of rapid change, also the relation 
between different welfare state configurations and social capital 
should be of interest for policy makers and the general public. This is 
because, as emphasized by the founding fathers of sociology 
(Durkheim 1893; Weber 1930), societies characterized by weak 
secondary groups and low levels of trust are more vulnerable to 
external shocks during the process of modernization.   
  At the theoretical level, one argument, supported by 
neoclassical and communitarian theorists, is that large welfare states 
are associated with lower levels of social capital (the so-called 
‗crowding out hypothesis‘). Neoclassical theorists postulated that 
large size welfare states provide excessive coverage against social 
risks and, as a consequence, might contribute to the creation of 
dependence among individuals (Barr 1992). In a similar vein, 
communitarians (Etzioni 1995; Nisbet 1969) suggested that overly 
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extended welfare states rule out private control over the small things 
of life (Wolf 1989). According to this approach, state-driven 
activities replace spontaneous solidarity and voluntary activity with 
bureaucratic ties. In turn, the prevalence of bureaucratic ties should 
be negatively related to social norms and trust. Diverging from 
neoclassical and communitarian theories, institutionalists (Rothstein 
2001; Skocpol 1996) highlighted that certain welfare state 
configurations might be positively associated to social capital (the 
so-called ‗crowding in hypothesis‘). In this respect, generous welfare 
states would tend to be positively related to social networks 
formation and embeddedness of common social norms, while means-
testing social programs would tend to be negatively associated to 
social capital reproduction (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005). 
Accordingly, a generous welfare state should also positively relate to 
institutional and interpersonal trust.  
 The contention of these theories has been primarily assessed 
by employing social spending as a measure to capture the existence 
of different welfare state configurations. However, building on 
comparative social policy literature, we argue that while social 
spending is more suited to capture the ‗size of the welfare state‘ – 
putting in operation the argument proposed by neoliberal and 
communitarian theorists, the degree of decommodification qualifies 
‗its level of generosity‘, being more apt to assess the contention 
suggested by institutional theorists. The remainder of the paper is as 
follows. The first part discusses the literature on the association 
between the welfare state and social capital; the second describes 
methods and data; and the third reflects upon the empirical findings 
gathered from Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and four 
regression models over two decades.  
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State of the Art 
The concept of social capital revitalized a long-standing debate, 
originally brought forward by the founding fathers of sociology 
(Durkheim 1893; Tocqueville 1961; Tönnies 1955; Weber 1930), on 
the role of secondary groups and trust for the functioning of modern 
societies (Ferragina 2010). Putnam‘s contribution (1993; 2000) 
transformed the social capital debate into one of the hottest topics 
ever to have appeared in social science. For this reason, we adopt 
Putnam‘s definition1 (1995: 67) in order to make our empirical 
measurement comparable with most previous sociological studies: 
―social capital refers to features of social organizations such as 
networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit‖.  
 The empirical assessment of the nexus between the welfare 
state and various aspects of social capital has intrigued scholars from 
different disciplines. Economists used experimental design and micro 
tax data to investigate whether public support to charities crowds out 
the propensity to donate or volunteer. Most studies, based on 
neoclassical theory, effectively find that public support crowds out 
voluntarism and the propensity to donate (i.e. Andreoni and Payne 
2011); however, a handful of other research finds no evidence for it 
(i.e. Meier 2007), and some scholars even emphasize the existence of 
relevant crowding in effects (Khanna and Sadler 2000; Okten and 
                                                          
1
 However, Putnam‘s definition, despite being largely employed in the field, has 
not been universally adopted in the literature. Adler and Kwon (2002) collected 
the most influential definitions of social capital, yet their review did not clarify 
the terms of the debate (for a genealogy of social capital theory see Ferragina and 
Arrigoni Forthcoming). Thus, the definition and measurement of social capital 
remain highly contested issues (Ferragina 2012). For a radical critique of 
Putnam‘s definition see Portes (1998).   
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Weisbrod 2000). Differently from economists, sociologists employed 
qualitative case studies or large-N comparative designs based on 
survey data in order to analyze much broader questions (De Wit 
2012). Also among sociologists there is no consensus. A large 
majority of studies indicate the existence of crowding in effects
2 
(Brewer et al. 2013; Larsen 2007; Salamon and Sokolowski 2001), 
others do not find significant evidence for crowding out (Kääriäinen 
and Lehtonen 2006; Gesthuizen et al. 2008; Van Oorschot and Arts 
2005), while fewer works highlight in specific cases (among people 
aged 60 and above, and among the upper and middle classes) the 
potential presence of crowding out (Scheepers et al. 2002; Scheepers 
and Te Grotenhuis 2005; Stadelmann-Steffen 2011). 
 While sociologists have mostly focused on one or more 
dimensions indicated by Putnam, economists have largely relied on 
specific observable variables for their measurements, i.e. 
volunteering, donations to charitable organizations, and in some 
cases also equated social capital to trust (i.e. Knack and Keefer 
1997). Despite using different variables, the findings gathered from 
economics can provide interesting insights also to assess the wider 
relation between different welfare state configurations and social 
capital. In this sense, Eckel et al. (2005) argued, that the extent of 
crowding out is dependent on the perception of and information 
available to the individuals about the source of charity funding. On 
the one hand, government financing does not seem to crowd out 
private giving when the donors do not have information about state 
donation. On the other hand, the government does seem to crowd out 
private donations when the transfer amount from the state is 
communicated to donors. We start from this contention in order to 
                                                          
2
 Van Ingen and Van der Mer (2011) emphasize that generous welfare states 
support the reduction of participatory inequality.  
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formulate an original hypothesis on the nexus between different 
welfare state configurations and social capital.  
 Transposing and readapting Eckel‘s line of reasoning to 
sociological research, one might argue that, when a welfare state is 
generous across the board, providing good services and transfers to a 
large majority of the population, individuals might not have a clear 
perception of the amount of money directly spent for people who are 
worst off. This might mean that, the presence of a generous welfare 
state could be positively associated with dense social networks, 
widely embedded social norms, and high levels of institutional and 
interpersonal trust. On the contrary, in the context of a lean welfare 
state, services tend to be means-tested and social provisions are 
highly stigmatizing for the minority of people in need that receive 
help. Hence, this configuration of the welfare state should be 
negatively associated with social capital, contributing to foster a 
sense of distance between the upper-middle and the lower classes.  
 As outlined in the introduction, previous sociological studies 
have tested the association between different welfare state 
configurations and social capital, simply considering social spending. 
However, conceptually, social spending measures the ‗size of the 
welfare state‘, while decommodification, as argued by many social 
policy scholars (Esping Andersen 1990; for a review see Ferragina 
2011), seems a better proxy to capture ‗the degree of generosity‘ 
displayed by different social security systems. Decommodification, 
defined as the ability of a welfare state to guarantee an acceptable 
standard of living to the population independently of market 
participation, differs from the other measure because it captures 
eligibility rules, restriction to entitlements, levels of replacement and 
cash allowances proposed by different social security systems rather 
than the simple spending (Esping-Andersen 1990). To sum up, 
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relying on social science theory, considering the contribution of 
experimental economics and comparative social policy literature, we 
hypothesize that high degrees of decommodification should be 
positively correlated with social capital, while at the same time, high 
levels of social spending should be associated with lower social 
capital scores.
3 
 
Methods and Data 
This paper uses Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) – a 
particular type of Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) – to measure 
social capital, testing whether the four dimensions of social 
networks, social norms, institutional and interpersonal trust combine 
into a single, yet multidimensional, concept. The scores calculated 
with the CFA are then regressed into the main micro and macro 
factors employed in the literature in order to investigate how 
different welfare state configurations are associated with high or low 
levels of social capital over time. We propose four different 
regression models to test this relation in the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
(1) The Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
We measure social capital with CFA for methodological and 
conceptual reasons (Muthén 1989). First, as defined by Putnam, 
social capital cannot be directly observed, but should rather be 
considered a latent variable. Second, by examining the covariance of 
a series of theory-driven observed items, CFA help us to capture the 
complexity of social capital with a single variable (Brown 2006). 
Following Putnam‘s theory, we already have a sense of which 
                                                          
3
 Reeskens and Van Oorschot (2014) have shown that crowding in and crowding 
out processes can coexist in the context of the current economic crisis.    
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observed variables should capture social capital, and on this basis, 
we employ a second order CFA to operationalize a suitable 
measurement. The first order CFA establishes the latent dimensions 
of social capital by quantifying the density of social networks, 
measuring the degree of embeddedness of social norms in society, 
and defining the level of institutional trust (interpersonal trust is 
directly observed in the survey). These three dimensions are 
measured using a series of observed items. Each observable item is 
represented in the CFA with a rectangle, while the latent variables 
are conventionally indicated with an oval. The second order CFA 
measures social capital from its dimensions.  
 Following CFA conventions, the black single-headed arrows 
represent coefficients or loadings in the model that reflect the 
relationships between the latent variables and their observed 
manifestations (the loading factors and error terms are reported close 
to the arrows). In addition, the grey arrows represent the correlation 
between the four latent dimensions among each other. The numbers 
shown are standardized coefficients that indicate the relative strength 
of the associations; larger numbers indicate stronger associations. 
Moreover, we display the correlation between each latent dimension 
and each observable item used to construct the social capital scores. 
Concerning the characteristics of the model, we use maximum 
likelihood as our method of estimation because data are normally 
distributed. In addition, in the results section, we describe the sample 
size, the treatment of missing variables, the battery of fit statistics, 
and the stability of the estimates across time and space. The software 
used to perform the analysis is Mplus. 
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The Dependent Variables 
We measure social capital as a latent variable constructed 
from four dimensions often employed in sociological literature to 
capture Putnam‘s conceptualization (Paxton 1999; Van Oorschot and 
Arts 2005). The social networks dimension is defined as the 
involvement of people in formal associations and their interest in 
politics. It captures the density of secondary groups in society 
(Putnam 1993; Paxton 1999), and refers to Tönnies‘s Gesellschaft 
(1955) and Durkheim‘s idea of organic solidarity (1893). 
Membership and participation measure individual interactions within 
the micro-sphere, while interest in politics captures the link between 
individuals and the macro-social sphere (Gorz 1999). High scores in 
this dimension suggest a strong overall involvement with societal 
issues (Parry et al. 1992). Membership and participation scores are 
measured as the sum of individual membership and participation in 
several organizations.
4
 Political interest is measured on a three-point 
scale that captures the frequency of political discussion with friends 
(Van Oorschot and Arts 2005). In accordance with amoral familism 
theory (Banfield 1958), we do not include informal social networks 
within this dimension but rather as an independent variable of the 
model (see micro variables).  
The social norms dimension is the most contested of the four 
constitutive elements of social capital because it does not measure 
people‘s social relations or level of social trust, but rather their 
                                                          
4
 Including welfare service for elderly, handicapped/deprived people; education, 
arts, music/cultural activities; political groups; local community action; Third 
World development/human rights; environment/animal rights; professional 
associations; youth work; sports/recreation; women‘s groups; peace movements; 
health; other groups. Religious associations and trade unions are considered only 
to measure the participation score (in Scandinavian countries, membership in 
these organizations is almost compulsory).  
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behavioral characteristics (Ferragina 2012; 2013; Van Oorschot and 
Arts 2005). According to Putnam, this variable reflects the level of 
commitment to general morality in society. The social norms 
dimension is measured with three items that consider whether people 
‗always justify‘, ‗never justify‘ or ‗something in between,‘ for 
instance, when claiming state benefits that one is not entitled to, 
lying in his/her own interest, and bribing in the course of his/her 
duties. 
The institutional trust dimension is captured via four items: 
the confidence in the education system, the parliament, the civil 
service, and the justice system (Van Oorschot and Arts 2005). 
Interpersonal trust is measured by looking at people‘s answer to the 
question, ‗Generally speaking, would you say that most people can 
be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?‘ 
The rationale underlying these two dimensions of social capital is 
that society functions best when it is underpinned by a conducive 
environment in which citizens have a high level of confidence in 
their institutions and in each other (Barber 1983; Putnam 2000).  
 
(2) The Regression Models 
In order to test our central hypothesis concerning the 
association between different welfare state configurations and social 
capital, we propose four different models, repeated at two points in 
time. The first model includes all micro and four macro correlates 
(social spending, economic development, income inequality and 
labour market participation), plus country-effects. Moreover, the 
model is based on the observations collected in 19 countries: 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, Belgium, 
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Slovenia, Germany, Spain, Great Britain, Italy, Slovakia, Poland, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, France, Greece and Portugal.
5 
 
The other models (2, 3, and 4) are restricted to 11 countries 
and exclude the least developed welfare states for which the 
decommodification scores are not available for the entire period 
under scrutiny. These countries have less consolidated welfare states 
and shorter democratic histories, i.e. Greece, Spain, and Portugal in 
the Mediterranean area, and the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Poland, Hungary in Eastern Europe. The three models specifically 
investigate the association between decommodification, social 
spending and social capital, also controlling for the other correlates 
included in the first model. More specifically, the second model 
assesses the correlation between decommodification and social 
capital, excluding social spending; the third includes both 
decommodification and social spending; and the fourth includes 
social spending but excludes decommodification. The analyses were 
performed using SPSS.  
There are two main issues related to the specification of these 
four regression models: first, the potential multicollinearity among 
the macro variables and second, the direction of causality. 
Multicollinearity is not an absolute problem but rather a matter of 
degree (O‘Brien 2007) and might be particularly severe in the 
regression model investigating the association of social spending and 
decommodification with social capital simultaneously (model 3). For 
this reason, we also assess the correlation between these contextual 
variables and social capital in isolation (models 2 and 4).  
                                                          
5
 We selected the most consolidated and relevant (in terms of size) European 
welfare states. For this reason we excluded the Baltic countries, Romania, 
Bulgaria and also the smallest countries, i.e. Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. 
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Moreover, our regression models are unable to test the 
direction of causality. Scholars have tried to address this issue by 
focusing on the link between the welfare state and trust. In a sample 
of 102 countries, Brewer, et al. (2013) do find a significant 
association between welfare state generosity and trust, but not the 
opposite. By contrast, Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011) argue, on the 
basis of a smaller sample of developed countries, that trust is high in 
generous welfare states because trusting populations have historically 
supported the provision of generous social policies. In consideration 
of the contrasting empirical findings of previous studies and the 
characteristics of our data, we prefer to simply discuss the 
association between variables rather than theoretically infer 
causality. Other limitations of this study worth mentioning are those 
traditionally discussed in comparative survey-based studies: the 
items selected may not be strictly comparable across countries 
(Durlauf 2002), regression models might not have impressive 
explanatory power (Van Oorschot and Arts 2005), and the ‗phantom 
menace‘ of omitted predictors bias has always to be accounted for 
(Clarke 2005).  
 
Macro Independent Variables 
As previously discussed, our central aim is to assess, 
considering both social spending and decommodification among the 
correlates, the relation between different welfare state configurations 
and social capital. On the one hand, social spending captures ‗the 
size of the welfare state‘. It is measured as a percentage of the GDP, 
and includes expenditure on old-age cash benefits, health care, 
disability, sickness, occupational injury and disease benefits, 
unemployment cash benefits, active labor market programs, family 
services and cash transfers, housing, and income maintenance. On 
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the other hand, decommodification captures ‗the degree of generosity 
of welfare state systems‘ and is measured according to the eligibility 
rules and restrictions of entitlements, the levels of income 
replacement and the range of cash benefits provided to deal with 
traditional social risks of unemployment, sickness and old age.  
To more clearly understand the difference between social 
spending and decommodification as proxies to capture the relation 
between different welfare state configurations and social capital, let‘s 
consider the examples of Denmark and France. The Danish welfare 
state system is more generous (the decommodification score is 
higher) than the French system (Esping-Andersen 1990). France, 
however, has the highest level of social spending in the OECD 
(2010). Hence, in line with the reasoning developed in the state of 
the art, one might expect the Danish welfare state configuration 
(higher generosity and lower spending than France) to be more 
positively associated with social capital than the French system 
(characterized by lower generosity and higher spending than 
Denmark). The regression models also include country-effects to 
capture additional features of the welfare state and their association 
with social capital.
6 
 
Building on previous literature (Helliwell and Putnam 1995; 
OECD 2001), the relation between economic development and social 
capital is measured using the GDP in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) 
terms (for a summary macro variables used in the literature see Table 
1). Income inequality, considered the most strongly correlated factor 
to collective action and social capital by Tocqueville (1961:8) and 
other scholars (Costa and Kahn 2003; Ferragina 2013; Knack and 
Keefer 1997; O‘Connel 2003), is measured using the Gini 
                                                          
6
 The dummies that measure country-effects employ Denmark as a reference 
category. 
12/2015 
14  
coefficient. Labor market participation, measured with activity rates, 
is also often included among the core correlates of social capital 
(Ferragina 2012).  
Table 1: Summary of the Main Social Capital Correlates 
Macro Level 
Factors Theoretical perspective Main Empirical Studies Main Indicators Correlation 
Economic 
development 
 Putnam (1993), Helliwell/Putnam 
(1995), Knack/Keefer (1997), 
OECD (2001) 
GDP per capita Positive  
Income 
Inequality 
Unequal societies are less 
conducive to associative 
participation and 
collective action than 
egalitarian societies 
(Tocqueville 1961) 
Costa/Kahn (2003), O‘Connel 
(2003)  
Gini coefficient Negative  
Labour 
market 
participation 
A more pronounced 
labour market 
participation is associated 
with higher social capital 
scores 
Hall (1999) Labour market 
participation 
Positive  
Welfare State Some scholar suggests 
that a generous welfare 
state 'crowds out' social 
capital and collective 
action (Nisbet 1969; 
Habermas 1973; Offe 
1984; Wolfe 1989; 
Etzioni 1995), while 
others argue the opposite 
(Skocpol 1996; Rothstein 
2001) 
- Crowding out: Scheepers et al. 
(2002), Scheepers/Te Grotenius 
(2005), Stadelmann-Steffen (2011). 
- No evidence for crowding out:  
Kaarianen/Lehtonen (2006), 
Gesthuizen et al. (2008), Van 
Oorschot/Arts (2005).  
- Crowding in: Brewer et al. 
(2013),  Larsen (2007), Parboteeah 
et al. (2004) Salomon/Sokolowski 
(2001) 
- Social expenditure 
- Welfare regime 
Mixed 
evidence  
Other macro factors are: racial fragmentation, fraction foreign born (Costa/Kahn 2003); labour force growth, black market 
premium, property rights, currency depreciation, institutional investor credit rating (Knack/Keefer 1997); transparency, R & D 
expenditure, work satisfaction, social satisfaction (O‘Connel 2003); urbanization (Scheepers et al. 2002); corruption (Putnam  
1993). 
Individual Level 
Indicators Studies using the indicator Correlation 
Income, education Hall (1999), Knack/Keefer (1997) Positive  
Age Brehm/Rahn (1997), Hall (1999), 
Putnam (1995). 
Positive  
Gender Brehm/Rahn (1997) Mixed evidence 
Employment status Hall (1999), Van Oorschot/Arts 
(2005) 
Sick and unemployed people tend to 
display lower social capital scores than the 
rest of the population  
Religion Arruñada (2010) Protestants tend to display higher social 
capital scores than Catholics  
Size of the city Brehm/Rahn (1997) Negative  
Familism: a high concern for the 
immediate family reduces the propensity 
to act collectively (Banfield 1958) 
Ferragina (2011) Negative  
Other individual level factors are: partisanship (Brehm/Rahn 1997; Van Oorschot/Arts 2005), region of origin, marital status, 
life satisfaction, Ethnic origin (Brehm/Rahn 1997); economic expectations (Brehm/Rahn 1997); sociability (Paxton 1999; 
Rothstein/Uslaner 2006).  
  
 
Source : Author‘s Elaboration 
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All macro variables are averaged out over a decade (1990-
1999 for the first period and 2000-2008 for the second). This is 
because certain values might fluctuate considerably over one year, 
i.e. social spending might go up as a consequence of a large spell of 
unemployment rather than a real change within welfare state 
provisioning. For this reason, Sabatier (1988) and Ferragina and 
Seeleib-Kaiser (2015) indicate that, at least when interpreting 
institutional change, it is better to consider decadal averages rather 
than yearly observations. 
 
Micro Independent Variables 
The regression model complements the macro correlates with 
a comprehensive map of individual variables (see Table 1 for a 
summary of the main variables employed in the literature). Net 
household income is measured using quintiles
7
 and educational 
attainment is split into five categories.
8
 Gender is considered using 
the dummy variable male
9 
and age is a categorical variable with four 
groups.
10
 Religious affiliation takes into account the classical 
Weberian hypothesis of the protestant ethic
11
 (Weber 1930). The first 
theoretical works on social capital discussed the different contexts in 
which it develops in rural and urban communities (Hanifan 1916; 
Jacobs 1961), hence the model also considers the size of the city of 
                                                          
7
 The top quintile is the omitted variable. 
8
 Basic education, second stage basic education, (upper) secondary education, post-
secondary/non-tertiary education, and tertiary education (the omitted variable). 
9
 With female as the omitted category. 
10
 Below age 23, aged between 24 and 50, aged between 50 and 65, and above age 
65 (the reference category). 
11
 Four categories are included: Catholic, Protestant, other religion, and people 
without religious affiliation (the omitted variable). 
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residence.
12
 Employment status is a categorical variable that 
distinguishes between part-time, self-employed, retired, people 
performing family tasks and informal work, students, unemployed, 
and other groups. The omitted variable is full-time employed. 
 Alongside the usual suspects, the model also takes into 
account the amoral familism hypothesis. Banfield (1958: 85) 
theorized that those who care only for their immediate family and 
tend to stick to their own affairs are less inclined to act collectively 
and trust other people. He originally applied this theory to the South 
of Italy, but his work has been also used to explain the lack of social 
capital in other contexts (Ferragina 2011). Five items are used to 
capture Banfield‘s hypothesis: the level of concern for the immediate 
family,
13
 for neighbors,
14
 and for human kind;
15
 the importance 
attributed to family;
16
 and the level of disagreement with the 
sentence ‗one should not simply stick to his/her own affairs.17 
 
Data 
The European Value Study (1999-2000; 2008) provides the micro 
variables for this analysis. The macro variables are gathered instead 
from a variety of sources: social expenditure data from the ‗Social 
Expenditure Dataset‘ (OECD 1990-2008); Decommodification 
scores from the ‗Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset‘ 
                                                          
12
 The variable includes four dummies: 0-10.000, 10.000-100.000, 100.000-
500.000, more than 500.000 inhabitants (reference category). 
13
 Measured with a three-point scale: high concern for the immediate family (the 
reference category), concern to a certain extent, no concern. 
14
 Measured as concern for immediate family. 
15
 See previous note. 
16
 Measured with a three-point scale: family is not important (the omitted variable), 
family is quite important, family is very important.  
17
 Measured with a three-point scale: ‗you should not simply stick to own affairs‘ 
(the omitted variable),‗you should to a certain extent‘ and ‗you should not‘.  
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(Scruggs 2004 and updates); GDP at Current Prices PPP and Labour 
Market Participation rates from Eurostat (1995-2008); and the Gini 
Coefficient from the UNU-Wider dataset (1990-2008). 
Results 
The result section is divided in two parts: the first illustrates the 
empirical findings gathered from the CFA, and the second describes 
the results of the regression models. In particular, while describing 
the findings for all correlates,18 we focus our attention to the 
analysis of the associations between decommodification, social 
spending and social capital, as well as to country variation. 
  
(1) The Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Our CFA is stable and reliable, as indicated by the sample 
size, the distribution of missing data, the characteristics of the items 
used to construct the social capital scores, and the fit statistics. First, 
the sample size is large enough to guarantee the stability of the 
models for both the 1990s and the 2000s.19 Second, the items 
employed in the CFA display a small number of missing data.
20 
Hence, as argued by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), their handling 
with list-wise deletion (the method we use) should not constitute a 
problem.
21
 Third, the descriptive statistics (average and standard 
                                                          
18
 The appendix includes detailed information concerning the four regression 
models for the 1990s and 2000s. 
19
 It is generally advised to have at least 10 individuals per estimated parameter 
(Brown 2006); we are above this threshold – with around 18000 observations for 
the first model and 20000 for the second. 
20
 Below 5% of the sample. 
21
 In addition, we also performed a Missing Value Analysis (MVA) of each item, 
which shows that the number of extreme values (Defined as cases with values 
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deviation) indicate our models are based on items and dimensions 
with similar distributions over the 1990s and 2000s
22
 (see Tables 2 
and 3, in annex). 
                                                                                                                                      
comprised between plus or minus two standard deviations from the average) is 
below the 5% threshold. These outliers are concentrated at the low-end, and only 
detected for the items used to construct social norms and institutional trust 
dimensions. 
22
 With the only partial exception of institutional trust – in this case the average has 
declined over the 2000s. However, as for the other latent variables, the standard 
deviation remains similar over the two periods, indicating that the distribution of 
data around the average has not significantly changed. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics macro variables and national averages for social capital and its dimensions,  
1990s and 2000s  
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Tables 3. Descriptive statistics micro variables (including items used to measure social capital and its dimensions),  
1999-2000 and 2008 
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Fourth, the model fit the data well, as shown by the most 
commonly employed indices in SEM literature (Brown 2006), i.e. the 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) and the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) are 
above the threshold of 0.9, and the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) is below 0.05 (Figure 1 and 2).  
 
Figure 1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis, 1999-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors‘ elaboration after EVS (1999-2000). 
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Figure 2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis, 2008 
 
 
 
After this scrutiny, we suggest that the data support the 
contention that dimensions of social networks, social norms, and 
institutional and interpersonal trust can be combined into a single 
trait. We argue, on the basis of Putnam‘s theory, that this single trait 
captures the degree of a person‘s social capital. All dimensions 
selected to measure social capital co-vary such that a high score on 
one is likely to be associated with a high score on another (Table 4). 
These dimensions load significantly on the comprehensive concept 
of social capital, which reflects dense/weak social networks, 
positively/negatively embedded social norms and high/low levels of 
institutional and interpersonal trust (Figures 1 and Table 2). 
Moreover, the observed items used to construct the dimensions of 
social capital are significantly correlated among each other (Table 5, 
see annex). For this reason, when discussing the findings of the 
Source: Authors‘ elaboration after EVS (2008). 
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regression models, we will focus on social capital rather than on its 
individual dimensions. Most of the time,
23 
the correlations will be 
similar.  
Table 4. CFA Correlation matrix social capital dimensions,  
1999-2000 and 2008   
1999-2000 Model 
 Social 
Networks 
Social 
Norms 
Institutional 
Trust  
Trust Social 
Capital 
Social Networks 1 0.101*** 0.156*** 0.244*** 0.713*** 
Social Norms  1 0.154*** 0.084*** 0.369*** 
Institutional 
Trust 
  1 0.161*** 0.582*** 
Trust    1 0.688*** 
Social Capital     1 
2008 Model 
 Social 
Networks 
Social 
Norms 
Institutional 
Trust 
Trust Social 
Capital 
Social Networks 1 0.103*** 0.269*** 0.275*** 0.696*** 
Social Norms  1 0.102*** 0.074*** 0.249*** 
Institutional 
Trust 
  1 0.219*** 0.689*** 
Trust    1 0.727*** 
Social Capital     1 
Note: *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Source: Author's elaboration after EVS (1999-2000; 2008). 
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 However, we will also discuss the presence of relations following different 
directions.  
1
2
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Table 5. Correlation matrix items used to construct social capital dimensions, 1999-2000 and 2008 
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The dimension with the highest loading into the social capital 
variable is social networks, followed by interpersonal and 
institutional trust, while the social norms dimension seems to play a 
less important role (Figure 1). The social network dimension is 
mostly characterized by membership and participation in associations 
and less by political interest. This confirms Putnam‘s theory (1995) 
that considers voluntarism to be the main component of social 
capital, as well as our own contention that social norms are the least 
decisive element of the construct. The observable items selected for 
the CFA proportionally shape the social norms and institutional trust 
dimensions, while trust is measured as a single observable item. 
Further, as one might expect from the picture dressed by descriptive 
statistics, the fit of the model, the factor loadings, and the 
correlations between the dimensions of social capital are highly 
stable over time
24
 (Figures 1 and 2, Tables 4 and 5) and space.
25
 This 
stability makes meaningful the comparison of our regression models 
over the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
(2) The Regression Models 
 
Assessing the Central Contention of the Paper  
Looking at descriptive statistics for the macro correlates, the 
average values for social expenditure, decommodification, the Gini 
coefficient and labour market participation are stable over time, 
while the standard deviations shrank. This decline is especially 
pronounced for the decommodification score (Table 2).  On the other 
hand, GDP per capita – mainly because it is measured as an absolute 
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 The only exception to this result is the loading of the observed item ‗civil‘ in the 
latent dimension institutional trust – which sharply declines over time (Figure 2). 
25
 We have also run the CFA for each nation obtaining similar factor loadings, 
errors, correlations and fit statistics. 
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value while the other variables are measured as percentages – 
displays a higher average and standard deviation over the 2000s. 
Moreover, also the averages and standard deviation for the micro 
correlates are stable over time and space (Table 3, in annex). 
 As previously discussed, our argument is based on 
comparisons between four regression models (Figure 3 synthetically 
describes these models, which are provided in appendix). The first 
tests the association of a series of micro, macro and country variables 
with social capital in 19 countries. The second, third and fourth 
assess, in a restricted sample of 11 countries, the salience of the 
relation between social spending, decommodification, and social 
capital (see Table 6). While in the first model (with 19 countries) the 
association between social spending and social capital flips from 
positive in the 1990s (cf. Van Oorschot and Arts 2005) to negative in 
the 2000s. In the third and fourth (with 11 countries), the association 
is stably negative (Table 6). How can we explain this flipping sign in 
the first model and the negative relation in the others?  
Figure 3. Basic structure regression models 
 
Source: Author‘s elaboration. 
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Table 6. Regressions explaining the variance of social capital and its 
dimensions from macro factors, controlling for the other micro and macro 
variables employed in the models (T-Standardised), 1990s and 2000s 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) The model includes all other control variables (their effect on the variance of social capital is 
shown in the appendix tables 1A/2A/4A/5A). 
(2) Model 11 Countries include: France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, 
Sweden, Ireland, Austria Denmark and Finland.  
(3) Linear regressions for Social Capital, Social Networks, Social Norms and Institutional Trust; logistic 
regression for Trust. 
Source: Author‘s elaboration after EVS (1999-2000; 2008), OECD (2010), Scruggs (2010), Eurostat 
(1995-2008), UNU-Wider (1990-2008).
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 One possible explanation of the results gathered from the first 
model might lay in the spending increase in countries where social 
capital is historically low (i.e. France +1.5%, Italy + 3.1%, Portugal 
+6%, and Greece +3.3%) and the decrease where it is traditionally 
high (i.e. Finland -4.1%, Sweden -3.4%, and the Netherlands -3%) 
(Table 7). Additional models, run excluding the Mediterranean 
countries, seem to confirm this argument, showing the existence of a 
negative relation between social spending and social capital in the 
1990s. The negative correlation also persists when social spending is 
measured in absolute terms rather than as a percentage of the GDP. 
Moreover, the positive relation detected in the 1990s for the full 
sample seems to be driven by the positive association between 
spending and institutional trust (Table 6). This correlation weakened 
over the following decade, and this might be due to the general 
decline of institutional trust in Europe (Table 2). 
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Table 7. The correlation between social spending and  
decommodification over time 
 
 
Social Expenditure Decommodification 
Countries 1990s 2000s Change 1990s 2000s Change 
France 28.1 29.6 1.5 30.3 27.4 -2.9 
Great Britain 19.1 20 0.9 20.6 21.7 1.1 
Germany 25.7 26.6 0.9 28.6 27.1 -1.5 
Italy 21.3 24.4 3.1 23.6 26.9 3.3 
Spain 21.2 20.9 -0.3 Mis. Mis. Mis. 
Netherlands 23.8 20.8 -3 35.1 35.2 0.1 
Belgium 26 26.2 0.2 32.6 32.3 -0.3 
Denmark 27.3 27.2 -0.1 36.5 35.2 -1.3 
Sweden 32.1 28.7 -3.4 41.3 35.8 -5.5 
Ireland 17.2 15.9 -1.3 24.3 28.3 4 
Austria 25.9 26.9 1 28.6 28.7 0.1 
Portugal 15.6 21.6 6 Mis. Mis. Mis. 
Finland 29.4 25.3 -4.1 33.5 30.5 -3 
Greece 17.4 20.7 3.3 Mis. Mis. Mis. 
Poland 21.9 21.1 -0.8 Mis. Mis. Mis. 
Czech Republic 17.3 18.9 1.6 Mis. Mis. Mis. 
Slovakia 18.4 16.7 -1.7 Mis. Mis. Mis. 
Hungary 21.6 22 0.4 Mis. Mis. Mis. 
Slovenia 21.8 21.1 -0.7 Mis. Mis. Mis. 
              
Correlations 
Social spending 1990s and 2000s [Full Sample]  0.85 
Social spending 1990s and 2000s [Restricted Sample] 0.86 
Decommodofication 1990s and 2000s 0.92 
Social spending and decommodification 1990s 0.84 
Social spending and decommodification 2000s 0.29 
Change of social spending and decommodification NS 
Source: Author‘s elaboration. 
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If we turn to the models with a restricted sample, the negative 
correlation between social spending and social capital can be 
tentatively interpreted by relying on previous literature and also on 
the central hypothesis of this paper. First, the relation between a large 
welfare state and social capital might be effectively negative as 
claimed by neoclassical and communitarian theorists. Second, as 
argued by Brewer et al. (2013), social spending might have a 
crowding in effect on social capital in less developed welfare states, 
until they reach maturity when additional spending might display a 
crowding out effect. Interestingly, scholars investigating the effect of 
government spending on charitable association in less developed and 
mature states refer to a similar ‗saturation‘ effect (Borgonovi 2006; 
Brooks 2000; Nikolova 2015). However, our empirical models 
cannot assess this hypothesis, but rather provide some additional 
grounding to previous interpretations.   
 Third, one can explain the negative correlation between social 
spending and social capital also taking into account the variation 
over time of decommodification. Social spending went up in large 
European countries, notably France, Italy, Germany, United 
Kingdom (and Austria), while decommodification did not 
significantly increase. Moreover, where social spending declined, i.e. 
the Netherlands and Ireland, there was no parallel decrease in the 
decommodification score (Table 6). This seems to confirm our 
original argument that in order to understand the relation between 
different welfare state configurations and social capital, one must 
consider both social spending and decommodification. Higher 
decommodification scores are effectively associated with higher 
levels of social capital. Moreover, countries that maintained high 
decommodification scores, and at the same time contained social 
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spending, i.e. Denmark and the Netherlands, are among those where 
the levels of social capital are high in both decades. 
 A positive mechanism relating certain welfare state 
configurations to social capital might derive from the fact that, over 
time, generous systems manage to reduce the perceived cultural 
distance between the majority of the population and people at the 
bottom of the income distribution. In this respect, Larsen (2007) 
argued that the high density of social capital in social democratic 
welfare regimes (as compared to liberal countries) is associated with 
the absence of a poor and culturally distinct under-class. In turn, the 
absence of such a cultural distinction is strongly related to high 
decommodification scores. Thorpe (2003), analyzing the Danish 
case, echoed Larsen‘s findings, showing that the traits of generous 
welfare states represent a form of bridging social capital, which 
fosters the belief among the population that they are part of a broad 
national community.  
 However, as signaled by the high correlation between social 
spending and decommodification over the 1990s (0.84, see Table 7), 
the relations observed might be biased by the presence of an elevated 
multicollinearity. If one considers the third regression model (which 
includes both social spending and decommodification), the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) is slightly superior to 3.26 Hence, the degree 
of multicollinearity is above the commonly accepted threshold of 
2.50 (O‘Brien 2007). For this reason, model 2 and 4 test whether the 
association between social spending, decommodification and social 
capital remains unchanged also when the two contextual variables 
are separately considered. Model 2 confirms the existence of a 
positive correlation between decommodification and social capital. 
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 While for the other macro variables are below 2. 
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Similarly, model 4 corroborates the negative association between 
social spending and social capital (Table 6). This means that, even if 
the third model might be biased by multicollinearity, our results are 
consistent when social spending and decommodification are analyzed 
in isolation. The issue of multicollinearity between 
decommodification and social spending does not seem to persist in 
the following decade. In this case, the correlation between 
decommodification and social spending drops at 0.29 (Table 7) and 
the VIF below two. This is explained by the fact that changes in 
spending and decommodification over the two decades are 
uncorrelated (see Table 7). Hence, one might argue that our 
hypothesis has more salience for the 2000s. 
Following the prescriptions proposed by Rohwer (2010) for 
models including a considerable number of macro variables and little 
institutional variation, we also run several regressions employing in 
turn only one or two macro variables. The direction of all 
correlations is unchanged. In this respect, it is important to 
emphasize, that due to the small number of countries included in 
models 2, 3 and 4, our results are not generalizable, but only 
applicable to the 11 countries included in the sample.  
 Turning to the other macro correlates, economic development 
seems to be positively associated with social capital in the first 
model, with 19 countries  considered. In particular, economic 
development is positively and strongly correlated with social 
network and trust dimensions (cf. Van Oorschot and Arts 2005). 
However, the association turns negative when we employ the three 
models with a restricted sample of countries (2, 3 and 4) (Table 6). 
At the substantive level, there might be a ‗saturation‘ effect 
(similarly to social spending): GDP is positively associated with 
social capital until the country reaches a certain level of 
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development. After this ‗critical juncture,‘ other variables, such as 
income inequality, could perhaps become more important. At the 
methodological level, it might also be that the GDP in rich European 
countries no longer perfectly reflects economic development. 
(Costanza et al. 2009). 
 Unlike economic development, income inequality seems to 
always be negatively associated with social capital (cf. Knack and 
Keefer 1997; Table 6). There are several mechanisms, analyzed in 
the literature, through which this association might come into play. 
First, inequality depresses social networks because people from 
different status groups have fewer opportunities to share common 
goals (Lancee and Werfhorst 2012). Second, economic resources 
might affect social networks and, in general, civic and social life. 
Hence, a high level of inequality depresses the participation of the 
underclass (Lancee and Werfhorst 2012; Larsen 2007). Third, the 
high level of inequalities result in growing social distances between 
people. Consequently, individuals may feel powerless and opt out of 
social engagement (Uslaner and Brown 2005).  
 Furthermore, and related to our research hypothesis, the 
positive correlation between income equality and social capital 
seems to also support the argument that a generous and redistributive 
welfare state might foster the creation of social networks and trust. 
This interpretation seems to be confirmed by another empirical 
finding: when the decommodification score is included in the model, 
the relation between income inequality and social capital weakens 
(Table 6). Decommodification seems to absorb a part of the 
association originally explained by income inequality. Finally, labor 
market participation is positively correlated with social capital (cf. 
Ferragina 2012). Also in this case, decommodification seems to 
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soften the correlation between labor market participation and social 
capital (Table 6). 
 To sum up the core findings of this section, social spending 
(read welfare state size) seems to be negatively correlated with social 
capital,
27
 while decommodification (read welfare state generosity) 
displays a positive association. Moreover, our empirical model seems 
to show that the positive correlation between decommodification and 
social capital is stronger than the negative relationship displayed with 
social spending (Table 6). 
 
Country Variation  
Social capital is higher in Nordic countries, at a medium level 
in conservative and liberal countries, and quite low in Mediterranean 
and Eastern European countries (Cf. France). Only Scandinavian 
countries seem to constitute a cohesive cluster, while there is more 
variation within the other regime types (Table 8). In Nordic 
countries, the voluntary sector operates in close partnership with the 
public sector, and this high level of synergy might have contributed 
to social capital reproduction (Henriksen and Bundesen 2004; 
Klausen and Selle 1996). The Swedish case is somewhat different 
from the other Nordic countries. According to our measurement, 
there was no significant difference between Sweden and Denmark in 
the 1990s. However, in the following decade, the gap between these 
countries grew and Sweden dropped many positions in the social 
capital ranking (Table 8). A potential explanation of this finding 
might be the dramatic drop of the Swedish decommodification score 
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 With the exception of a weak positive relation in the model with 19 countries for 
the 1990s. 
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(signaling a decline of the generosity level
28
) (Table 2). Once again, 
however, we emphasise that we cannot infer causation, but simply 
provide food for thought that these relationships must be further 
assessed.   
Table 8. Regressions explaining the variation of social capital by country, controlling 
for the other micro and macro variables employed in the models (T-Standardised), 
1990s and 2000s 
Countries Social Capital 1990s 
(Model 1) 
Countries Social Capital 2000s 
(Model 1) 
Denmark (reference) 
 
Denmark (reference) 
 
Sweden NS Netherlands NS 
Finland -3.457 Finland -8.826 
Netherlands -3.816 Slovenia -10.233 
Austria -11.528 Ireland -14.452 
Ireland -13.964 Sweden -15.523 
Belgium -18.501 Belgium -18.974 
Slovenia -18.529 Great Britain -21.300 
Germany -18.651 Austria -21.955 
Spain -18.944 Spain -24.332 
Great Britain -20.663 France -24.644 
Italy -21.563 Italy -24.774 
Slovakia -22.272 Czech Republic -25.688 
Poland -22.300 Slovakia -27.475 
Hungary -23.218 Germany -28.695 
Czech Republic -23.247 Poland -29.756 
France -23.304 Greece -30.447 
Greece -24.385 Portugal -30.873 
Portugal Missing Hungary -32.830 
  
                                                          
28
 Scholarship is divided on the actual retrenchment of the Swedish welfare state. 
Anderson (2001)  argues for retrenchment, while Lindbom (2001) suggests that 
the Swedish model is not losing its universal features. Furthermore, our findings 
contrast with Rothstein‘s (2001) analysis. Hence, the potential decline of 
Swedish social capital in parallel with welfare generosity requires further 
investigation.  
Notes: The model includes all other control variables (their effect on the variance of social capital is 
shown in the appendix tables 1A/2A/4A/5A).  
Source: Author‘s elaboration after EVS (1999-2000; 2008), OECD (2010), Scruggs (2010), Eurostat 
(1995-2008), UNU-Wider (1990-2008). 
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As we might expect from welfare regime theory (Ferragina 
and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011), the other country clusters are not as 
homogenous as the social democratic regime. In conservative 
countries, volunteering is far less pronounced than in Scandinavia 
and frequently stands in an instrumental and somewhat strained 
relationship with the state. It is more likely that in this setting the 
welfare state and the third sector (often related to religious activities) 
are a substitute for each other (Anheier and Salamon 2011). There 
are significant differences between Austria and Belgium on the one 
hand, and France and Germany on the other. In Austria, employment 
policies have been slightly diverging from other conservative 
countries and they have been influenced more strongly by 
Keynesianism (Scharpf 1991). In Belgium, social democratic 
principles have accompanied the largely dominant Christian 
Democratic nature of the welfare state because the Socialist party, 
often a junior element in governmental coalitions, has considerably 
influenced policy-making. The existence of some social democratic 
features
29
 in these two countries becomes clearly apparent when they 
are compared to France and Germany – which are considered ‗pure‘ 
conservative models (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011).  
 The residual nature of the welfare state and people‘s strong 
reliance on the market for social provisions and social services make 
liberal countries highly heterogeneous. The empirical model suggests 
that Ireland, with its conservative features (Daly 1999), has higher 
levels of social capital than the United Kingdom (cf. Ferragina 
2012). Mediterranean countries have lower levels of social capital 
than Liberal countries, and the determinants of this shortage have 
                                                          
29
 Esping-Andersen (1990) classified Austria and Belgium as social democratic 
countries according to the decommodification score. 
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been widely discussed in the literature (Putnam 1993). Despite the 
generalized low level of social capital, there are important 
differences between Italy and Spain on one side and Greece and 
Portugal on the other (Ferragina 2012). The divergent pattern in the 
Mediterranean area might also be due to different levels of welfare 
state consolidation (Ferrera 1996).  
 Finally, Eastern European countries also display low social 
capital scores. This has been explained as the enduring legacy of 
communism, which might have contributed to the reduction of social 
ties and interpersonal trust (Raiser 2001; Volker and Flap 2001). The 
only remarkable exception is Slovenia, where social capital seems to 
be particularly high. One interesting element and potential 
explanation of the Slovenian case might be the positive and 
reinforcing role of income equality.  
 
Micro Variables 
The association (in terms of direction and size) between 
individual level variables and social capital is similar in both decades 
and confirm the previous literature (see Table 1 and Appendix). 
Income is the variable more strongly correlated to social capital (cf. 
Knack and Keefer 1997). Education is also positively associated with 
social capital and its dimensions (cf. Hall 1999), with the remarkable 
exception of social norms. Men tend to display higher social capital 
scores than women (mainly because of their stronger involvement in 
social networks, see Brehm and Rahm 1997), except for when it 
comes to trust and social norms dimensions. Older people tend to 
have more social capital than younger generations. However, the 
model cannot disentangle the generational from the real age effect 
(cf. Hall 1999). Protestants tend to have higher social capital scores 
than Catholics and the difference is very pronounced (cf. Arruñada 
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2010). People living in cities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants 
tend to have more social capital than those living in large cities; this 
is true for all dimensions of social capital except interpersonal trust 
(cf. Brehm and Rahm 1997). The unemployed are likely to record 
low social capital scores, while social capital is higher among 
students and people with stable jobs (cf. Van Oorschot and Arts 
2005). 
 The amoral familism hypothesis seems to be generally 
applicable to these phenomena (cf. Ferragina 2011). People more 
concerned with their immediate family tend to display lower levels 
of social capital, while people concerned with their neighbourhoods 
and human kind record higher social capital scores. Furthermore, 
those that consider family important have a higher level of social 
capital than other individuals. This means that social capital does not 
seem to be negatively associated with family values, while 
excessively concentrated bonding ties might be negatively related to 
social networks and trust.  
Conclusion 
The paper contributes to the literature with an assessment of 
the relation between different welfare state configurations and social 
capital, emphasising the association between welfare state size and 
welfare state generosity over two decades. In this regard, our main 
finding is that, among the most developed welfare states, high 
degrees of decommodification are positively and strongly correlated 
to social capital, while social spending seems to display a negative 
association. Moreover, the positive relation between 
decommodification and social capital is stronger than the negative 
relation with social spending. Our results seem to partially confirm 
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the concern of neoclassical and communitarian theories for the 
negative relation between welfare state size and social capital, while 
they support the contention of the institutional theory that generous 
welfare states are positively associated with social capital. Alongside 
the welfare state, low-income inequalities and high labor market 
participation are positively associated with social capital, while the 
effect of economic development remains much less clear. 
 Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands have the highest 
level of social capital in Europe, and conservative and liberal 
countries are in the middle of the ranking, displaying substantive 
differences (Austria, Belgium and Ireland have higher social capital 
scores than France, Germany and the United Kingdom). Some of 
these differences might be due to alternative social security features 
embedded in the dominant conservative and liberal layouts of these 
welfare states, e.g. social democratic influences in the case of 
conservative welfare states like Austria and Belgium, and 
conservative features in the liberal case of Ireland. Furthermore, 
Mediterranean and Eastern European countries have low social 
capital scores, with the remarkable exception of Slovenia. The 
positive correlation between the existence of a generous welfare state 
and social capital seems to be particularly persistent in countries 
where high decommodification scores go hand in hand with 
controlled social spending, i.e. Denmark and the Netherlands.  
At this point, we must highlight two important challenges to 
our findings. First, both the use of decommodification and social 
spending to capture different welfare state configurations has been 
criticized in the literature (Scruggs 2007; Ferragina and Seeleib-
Kaiser 2011). In particular, the decommodification score, despite 
being the most used indicator to measure the existence of different 
welfare regimes (Scruggs and Allan 2006), is based on the generosity 
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of social protection for the average (production) worker (Ferragina 
and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011) and does not fully account for the levels of 
social protection guaranteed to young people (Scruggs 2007) and 
women (Lewis 1992). Nevertheless, at present there is no better 
synthetic indicator to measure welfare state generosity in the 
literature. Second, the social capital concept has been criticized for 
its vagueness (Durlauf 2002) and, in addition, comparative surveys 
tend to capture only a certain type of social relations. These relations 
are normally entertained by the upper-middle class, but are much less 
frequent among the rest of the population that relies on other forms 
of social interaction (Orton 2006). This issue might be tackled by 
pursuing, a comparative qualitative analysis of people‘s alternative 
forms of social participation in parallel with quantitative 
measurement, especially for those who belong to the lower classes.  
Discounting these important limitations, we want to provide a 
tentative macro hypothesis to interpret the strong association 
between different welfare state configurations and social capital30 on 
the basis of our findings. Rothstein (2008) has argued that the 
existence of a sequence of feedback effects between the welfare state 
and social capital can explain the peculiarity of the Scandinavian 
case. He explained the high density of social capital in Scandinavian 
countries with a historical ‗critical juncture,‘ in which these countries 
managed to set in motion a process of mutual reinforcement between 
generous social policy and social capital creation.  
One might generalize this theoretical reasoning, claiming that 
the correlation between the degree of generosity of the welfare state 
and social capital might have been magnified over time by a process 
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 Other than the punctual explanations provided by Larsen (2007) and Thorpe 
(2003) that we have previously described. 
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of mutual reinforcement (positive or negative).
31
 The establishment 
of a generous welfare state might have contributed to crowd in social 
capital and then, in turn, the increased social capital might have been 
conducive to widen popular and political support for the welfare 
state. Conversely, the consolidation of a residual welfare state might 
have contributed to crowd out social capital, and the decreased level 
of social capital might have reduced the support for generous social 
provisions. It is interesting to note in this regard that, in Sweden, the 
level of decommodification and the average social capital score have 
declined in parallel over the 2000s (Table 2). The situation is 
different in Denmark, where decommodification has remained 
high,
32
 as much as the average social capital score. Perhaps big social 
processes are setting in motion in parts of Scandinavia, 
simultaneously undermining the generosity of the welfare state and 
the density of social capital. These processes might reverse the 
secular past positive and reinforcing feedback effect theorized by 
Rothstein (2008). However, this hypothesis and its potential general 
explanatory value might have to be scrutinized with a comparative 
historical analysis between Denmark and Sweden.  
 Paraphrasing Marshall (1963), we conclude that welfare 
states able to guarantee universal social citizenship over time through 
generous social provisions do not only reduce the risk of social 
exclusion, poverty, and inequality, but seem also to be largely 
associated with denser social networks, more embedded social norms 
and higher institutional and interpersonal trust in society.  
  
  
                                                          
31
 However, our model is unable to test causality, so this argument requires further 
validation. 
32
 Although slightly declining during the 2000s. 
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Annexes 
 
 
Social Networks Social Norms Institutional Trust Trust Social Capital 
Micro Variables B StdEr t Sig B StdEr T Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig 
Income 5                                          
Income1 -0.28 0.02 -16.25 *** -0.03 0.02 -1.15 NS -0.09 0.01 -7.87 *** -0.15 0.01 -10.68 *** -0.10 0.01 -17.29 *** 
Income2 -0.22 0.02 -14.20 *** -0.01 0.02 -0.31 NS -0.06 0.01 -5.01 *** -0.14 0.01 -10.44 *** -0.08 0.01 -14.68 *** 
Income3 -0.16 0.02 -10.22 *** 0.00 0.02 -0.17 NS -0.05 0.01 -4.11 *** -0.10 0.01 -8.05 *** -0.06 0.01 -11.02 *** 
Income4 -0.07 0.02 -4.59 *** 0.01 0.02 0.31 NS -0.02 0.01 -1.93 NS -0.04 0.01 -2.96 *** -0.03 0.01 -4.57 *** 
Tertiary education                                          
Basic Education -0.16 0.01 -12.09 *** -0.02 0.02 -0.98 NS -0.04 0.01 -4.01 *** -0.13 0.01 -12.35 *** -0.06 0.00 -14.22 *** 
Second stage basic education 
-0.10 0.01 -7.58 *** 0.00 0.02 -0.22 NS -0.08 0.01 -7.92 *** -0.14 0.01 -12.25 *** -0.06 0.00 -13.36 *** 
(Upper) secondary education 
-0.04 0.01 -3.33 *** -0.03 0.02 -2.07 ** -0.03 0.01 -3.73 *** -0.08 0.01 -7.79 *** -0.03 0.00 -7.46 *** 
Post-secondary non- tertiary  
-0.05 0.01 -3.96 *** -0.01 0.02 -0.70 NS -0.09 0.01 -9.23 *** -0.09 0.01 -8.37 *** -0.05 0.00 -10.03 *** 
Female                                          
Male 0.07 0.01 7.56 *** -0.09 0.01 -7.39 *** 0.00 0.01 0.27 NS 0.01 0.01 1.59 NS 0.01 0.00 3.16 *** 
Age>65                                          
Age<23 -0.08 0.02 -3.44 *** -0.44 0.03 -13.46 *** -0.03 0.02 -2.08 ** -0.04 0.02 -1.76 NS -0.05 0.01 -6.56 *** 
23<Age2< 50 -0.01 0.02 -0.52 NS -0.25 0.02 -10.16 *** -0.04 0.01 -3.04 *** 0.00 0.01 0.00 NS -0.02 0.01 -3.91 *** 
50<Age3<65 0.06 0.02 4.08 *** -0.08 0.02 -3.93 *** -0.01 0.01 -1.24 NS 0.04 0.01 2.89 *** -0.01 0.01 -2.22 ** 
No Religion                                          
Catholic -0.02 0.01 -1.79 NS 0.15 0.01 -10.79 *** 0.08 0.01 10.95 *** -0.03 0.01 -3.03 *** 0.02 0.00 4.54 *** 
Protestant 0.20 0.01 15.99 *** 0.25 0.02 -14.59 *** 0.18 0.01 20.53 *** 0.18 0.01 16.75 *** 0.13 0.00 28.36 *** 
Other Religions 0.12 0.02 7.17 *** 0.09 0.02 3.95 *** -0.03 0.01 -2.75 *** -0.07 0.01 -5.09 *** 0.01 0.01 0.87 NS 
Table 1A. Regressions explaining the variance of social capital and its dimensions (Model 1), 1990s  
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More than 500k inh.                                          
Between 0 and 10K inh.  
0.09 0.01 6.66 *** 0.13 0.02 7.44 *** 0.06 0.01 6.27 *** -0.02 0.01 -1.78 NS 0.03 0.00 6.92 *** 
Between 10K and 100k inh.  
0.08 0.01 6.60 *** 0.11 0.02 6.62 *** 0.02 0.01 2.61 *** -0.01 0.01 -1.13 NS 0.02 0.00 5.53 *** 
Between 100k and 500k inha.  
0.06 0.01 4.19 *** 0.11 0.02 5.47 *** 0.00 0.01 0.40 NS 0.00 0.01 -0.05 NS 0.02 0.01 3.62 *** 
Full time                                          
Part time 0.05 0.02 2.86 *** 0.02 0.02 1.05 NS 0.00 0.01 -0.19 NS 0.03 0.01 1.94 NS 0.02 0.01 2.56 *** 
Self-employed -0.01 0.02 -0.28 NS 0.02 0.03 0.64 NS -0.03 0.01 -2.33 ** 0.03 0.02 1.75 NS 0.00 0.01 -0.05 NS 
Retired -0.04 0.02 -2.78 *** 0.05 0.02 2.50 ** 0.03 0.01 2.69 *** -0.03 0.01 -2.63 *** -0.01 0.01 -1.09 NS 
Housewife -0.10 0.02 -6.21 *** 0.05 0.02 2.21 ** 0.05 0.01 4.24 *** -0.04 0.01 -3.16 *** -0.02 0.01 -2.61 *** 
Student 0.11 0.02 5.00 *** -0.10 0.03 -3.27 *** 0.04 0.02 2.73 *** 0.08 0.02 4.54 *** 0.04 0.01 5.13 *** 
Unemployed -0.13 0.02 -7.19 *** -0.22 0.02 -9.07 *** -0.02 0.01 -1.41 NS -0.04 0.02 -2.44 ** -0.05 0.01 -7.63 *** 
Other status -0.10 0.03 -3.41 *** -0.01 0.04 -0.22 NS 0.03 0.02 1.41 NS -0.03 0.03 -1.26 NS -0.02 0.01 -1.90 * 
High Concern Im. Fam.                                          
To a certain extent 0.06 0.01 4.14 *** 0.02 0.02 1.20 NS -0.03 0.01 -2.45 ** 0.02 0.01 1.77 NS 0.01 0.01 2.34 ** 
Not concerned  0.10 0.02 6.27 *** 0.15 0.02 6.99 *** 0.03 0.01 2.95 *** 0.10 0.01 7.30 *** 0.05 0.01 9.69 *** 
Family Not important                                          
Family quite important -0.03 0.03 -0.83 NS 0.19 0.04 4.63 *** 0.04 0.02 2.02 ** 0.01 0.03 0.47 NS 0.02 0.01 1.73 * 
Family very important 0.00 0.03 -0.15 NS 0.37 0.04 9.45 *** 0.07 0.02 3.55 *** -0.02 0.02 -0.69 NS 0.03 0.01 3.21 *** 
High Concern neigh.                                          
To a certain extent 
 -0.04 0.01 -3.53 *** 0.03 0.01 1.96 ** -0.05 0.01 -7.33 *** -0.04 0.01 -4.27 *** -0.02 0.00 -6.60 *** 
No Concern  -0.09 0.01 -7.40 *** -0.05 0.02 -2.83 *** -0.09 0.01 -10.67 *** -0.05 0.01 -4.77 *** -0.05 0.00 -11.32 *** 
High Concern Human Kind 
                                        
To a certain extent -0.08 0.01 -7.42 *** -0.09 0.01 -6.34 *** -0.01 0.01 -1.36 NS -0.06 0.01 -7.04 *** -0.03 0.00 -9.28 *** 
No Concern  -0.14 0.01 -12.26 *** -0.17 0.02 -11.45 *** -0.05 0.01 -6.88 *** -0.11 0.01 -12.10 *** -0.07 0.00 -17.80 *** 
Not simply stick own affairs                                          
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Disagree to a certain extent 
-0.12 0.01 -10.36 *** -0.08 0.02 -5.20 *** -0.01 0.01 -1.14 NS -0.06 0.01 -5.94 *** -0.04 0.00 -10.021 
*** 
Disagree -0.12 0.01 -11.88 *** -0.11 0.01 -8.24 *** -0.01 0.01 -0.78 NS -0.09 0.01 -10.78 *** -0.05 0.00 -13.76 *** 
(Constant) 0.49 0.04 12.58 *** -0.19 0.05 -3.57 *** 0.04 0.03 1.49 NS 0.66 0.03 20.58 *** 0.16 0.01 12.08 *** 
 
  Social Networks Social Norms Institutional Trust Trust Social Capital 
Macro variables B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig. B StdEr t Sig. B StdEr T Sig. B StdEr t Sig. 
Social Expenditure  -0.01 0.00 -3.35 *** -0.01 0.00 -4.00 *** 0.01 0.00 7.55 *** 0.01 0.00 6.11 *** 0.00 0.00 3.46 *** 
Economic Development  0.00 0.00 10.77 *** 0.00 0.00 8.04 *** 0.00 0.00 4.85 *** 0.00 0.00 10.42 *** 0.00 0.00 14.90 *** 
Income Inequality  -0.03 0.00 -17.22 *** -0.01 0.00 -2.94 *** 0.00 0.00 -1.85 NS 0.00 0.00 -2.35 ** -0.01 0.00  -11.81 *** 
Labour Market Participation  0.01 0.00 8.77 *** 0.00 0.00 0.18 NS 0.00 0.00 6.44 *** 0.00 0.00 5.04 *** 0.00 0.00 9.88 *** 
 
  Social Networks Social Norms Institutional Trust Trust Social Capital 
Countries B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig 
Denmark                                         
France 
-0.35 0.03 -12.08 *** -0.76 0.04 -18.87 *** -0.19 0.02 -9.27 *** -0.41 0.02 -16.92 *** -0.24 0.01 -23.30 *** 
Great Britain 
-0.39 0.03 -14.13 *** -0.41 0.04 -10.73 *** -0.17 0.02 -8.45 *** -0.33 0.02 -13.96 *** -0.20 0.01 -20.66 *** 
Germany 
-0.31 0.03 -11.17 *** -0.56 0.04 -14.36 *** -0.17 0.02 -8.50 *** -0.27 0.02 -11.46 *** -0.18 0.01 -18.65 *** 
Italy 
-0.40 0.03 -13.87 *** -0.30 0.04 -7.45 *** -0.25 0.02 -12.34 *** -0.35 0.02 -14.44 *** -0.22 0.01 -21.56 *** 
Spain 
-0.51 0.03 -15.90 *** -0.48 0.04 -10.78 *** -0.14 0.02 -6.04 *** -0.29 0.03 -10.63 *** -0.21 0.01 -18.94 *** 
Netherlands 
0.10 0.03 3.21 *** -0.35 0.04 -8.24 *** -0.09 0.02 -3.98 *** -0.10 0.03 -4.09 *** -0.04 0.01 -3.82 *** 
Belgium 
-0.16 0.03 -5.59 *** -0.65 0.04 -16.20 *** -0.20 0.02 -9.59 *** -0.37 0.02 -15.15 *** -0.19 0.01 -18.50 *** 
Sweden 
0.17 0.03 5.51 *** -0.33 0.04 -7.68 *** -0.06 0.02 -2.76 *** -0.05 0.03 -1.81 NS -0.01 0.01 -1.00 NS 
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Ireland 
-0.28 0.03 -8.82 *** -0.28 0.04 -6.25 *** -0.09 0.02 -3.95 *** -0.33 0.03 -12.21 *** -0.15 0.01 -13.96 *** 
Austria 
-0.14 0.03 -4.58 *** -0.42 0.04 -10.12 *** -0.04 0.02 -2.04 ** -0.29 0.02 -11.55 *** -0.12 0.01 -11.53 *** 
Portugal (Missing)                                 
 
      
Finland 
0.01 0.03 0.48 NS -0.24 0.04 -6.53 *** -0.03 0.02 -1.58 NS -0.07 0.02 -3.25 *** -0.03 0.01 -3.46 *** 
Greece 
-0.35 0.04 -9.90 *** -0.73 0.05 -14.74 *** -0.47 0.03 -18.27 *** -0.47 0.03 -15.51 *** -0.30 0.01 -24.38 *** 
Poland 
-0.52 0.03 -16.79 *** -0.29 0.04 -6.62 *** -0.19 0.02 -8.63 *** -0.42 0.03 -16.15 *** -0.24 0.01 -22.30 *** 
Czech Republic  
-0.17 0.03 -6.36 *** -0.49 0.04 -13.05 *** -0.33 0.02 -16.82 *** -0.44 0.02 -19.32 *** -0.22 0.01 -23.25 *** 
Slovakia 
-0.10 0.03 -3.26 *** -0.85 0.04 -20.90 *** -0.23 0.02 -10.81 *** -0.54 0.02 -21.94 *** -0.23 0.01 -22.27 *** 
Hungary 
-0.49 0.03 -16.42 *** -0.49 0.04 -11.88 *** -0.19 0.02 -9.04 *** -0.39 0.02 -15.70 *** -0.24 0.01 -23.22 *** 
Slovenia 
-0.27 0.03 -8.24 *** -0.42 0.05 -9.09 *** -0.23 0.02 -9.62 *** -0.44 0.03 -15.74 *** -0.21 0.01 -18.53 *** 
Notes:  (1) *** Significant at the 0.01 level, ** Significant at the 0.05 level, * Significant at the 0.10 (2-tailed). 
(2) Linear regressions for Social Capital, Social Networks, Social Norms and Institutional Trust; logistic regression for Trust. 
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Table 2A. Regressions explaining the variance of social capital and its dimensions  
(testing the decommodification hypothesis with 11 countries), detail macro variables (Models 2, 3, 4), 1990’s 
 
  Social  Networks Social Norms Institutional Trust Trust Social Capital 
Model 2 
B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig 
Decommodification  0.03 0.00 15.29 *** 0.01 0.00 4.16 *** 0.00 0.00 1.08 NS 0.01 0.00 4.16 *** 0.00 0.00 7.29 *** 
Economic Development  
0.00 0.00 2.99 *** 0.00 0.00 -0.82 NS 0.00 0.00 0.01 NS 0.00 0.00 -0.82 NS 0.00 0.00 2.21 ** 
Income Inequality  
0.01 0.00 1.34 NS -0.01 0.00 -2.78 *** -0.01 0.00 -2.41 ** -0.01 0.00 -2.78 *** -0.01 0.00 -4.16 *** 
Labour Market Participation  
0.01 0.00 4.62 *** 0.01 0.00 6.94 *** 0.01 0.00 9.47 *** 0.01 0.00 6.94 *** 0.00 0.00 8.81 *** 
 
  Social  Networks Social Norms Institutional Trust Trust Social Capital 
Model 3 
B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr T Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig 
Decommodification   0.04 0.00 17.99 *** 0.02 0.00 8.95 *** 0.01 0.00 3.83 *** 0.02 0.00 8.95 *** 0.01 0.00 14.41 *** 
Social Expenditure  -0.03 0.00 -10.11 *** -0.04 0.00 -13.71 *** -0.02 0.00 -7.61 *** -0.04 0.00 -13.71 *** -0.02 0.00 -20.45 *** 
Economic Dvp.  0.00 0.00 -2.17 ** 0.00 0.00 -7.26 *** 0.00 0.00 -3.61 *** 0.00 0.00 -7.26 *** 0.00 0.00 -7.71 *** 
Income Inequality  -0.03 0.00 -5.60 *** -0.04 0.00 -11.10 *** -0.02 0.00 -6.80 *** -0.04 0.00 -11.10 *** -0.03 0.00 -16.53 *** 
Labour Market  Participation 
0.00 0.00 1.08 NS 0.00 0.00 2.15 ** 0.01 0.00 6.51 *** 0.00 0.00 2.15 ** 0.00 0.00 1.79 * 
 
  Social  Networks Social Norms Institutional Trust Trust Social Capital 
Model 4 
B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr T Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig 
Social Expenditure 1990s -0.01 0.00 -3.78 *** -0.03 0.00 -11.16 *** -0.01 0.00 -6.66 *** -0.03 0.00 -11.16 *** -0.02 0.00 -16.16 *** 
Economic Dvp 0.00 0.00 -0.41 NS 0.00 0.00 -6.36 *** 0.00 0.00 -3.25 *** 0.00 0.00 -6.36 *** 0.00 0.00 -6.34 *** 
Income Inequality 1990s -0.05 0.00 -12.01 *** -0.06 0.00 -14.69 *** -0.03 0.00 -8.47 *** -0.06 0.00 -14.69 *** -0.03 0.00 -22.32 *** 
Labour Market Participation 1990s 0.00 0.00 0.13 NS 0.00 0.00 1.83 NS 0.01 0.00 6.35 *** 0.00 0.00 1.83 NS 0.00 0.00 1.06 NS 
Notes: (1) The countries included in the analysis are: France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, Finland and Denmark.  
(2) *** Significant at the 0.01 level, ** Significant at the 0.05 level, * Significant at the 0.10 (2-tailed). 
(3) Linear regressions for Social Capital, Social Networks, Social Norms and Institutional Trust; logistic regression for Trust.  
Source: Author's elaboration after EVS (1999-2000); OECD (1990-1999); (Scruggs, 2004); Eurostat (1995-1999); UNU-WIDER (1990-1999). 
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Table 3A. Summary R square and number of cases (Models 1, 2, 3, 4), 1990s 
 
  Social 
Networks 
Social 
Norms 
Institutional 
Trust 
Tru
st 
Social 
Capital R square 1 0.194 0.148 0.115 0.15
3 
0.254 
Number of 
cases 
18370 18370 18370 177
61 
18331 
R quare 2 0.179 0.121 0.071 0.12
1 
0.230 
R square 3 0.186 0.135 0.075 0.13
5 
0.256 
R square 4 0.163 0.129 0.072 0.12
9 
0.243 
Number of 
cases 
11813 11571 11951 115
71 
11183 
Source: Author's elaboration after EVS (1999-2000); OECD (1990-1999); 
(Scruggs, 2004); Eurostat (1995-1999); UNU-WIDER (1990-1999 
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Table 4A. Regression explaining the variance of social capital and its components (Model 1), 2000s  
 Social Networks Social Norms Institutional Trust Trust Social Capital 
Micro Variables  B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig 
Income 5                                          
Income1 -0.25 0.02 -15.62 *** -0.06 0.03 -2.13 ** -0.18 0.02 -11.90 *** -0.18 0.02 -10.76 *** -0.13 0.01 -18.55 *** 
Income2 -0.21 0.01 -18.73 *** -0.05 0.02 -2.48 *** -0.15 0.01 -14.43 *** -0.17 0.01 -14.52 *** -0.11 0.00 -23.07 *** 
Income3 -0.18 0.01 -18.62 *** -0.01 0.02 -0.85 NS -0.11 0.01 -12.75 *** -0.14 0.01 -14.61 *** -0.09 0.00 -22.05 *** 
Income4 -0.09 0.01 -10.90 *** -0.04 0.01 -2.67 *** -0.08 0.01 -10.82 *** -0.10 0.01 -11.76 *** -0.06 0.00 -16.39 *** 
Tertiary education  
                    
Basic Education -0.17 0.01 -12.99 *** 0.02 0.02 1.02 NS -0.05 0.01 -4.08 *** -0.14 0.01 -10.67 *** -0.07 0.01 -13.13 *** 
Second stage basic education -0.07 0.01 -7.08 *** -0.01 0.02 -0.83 NS -0.05 0.01 -5.19 *** -0.12 0.01 -11.10 *** -0.05 0.00 -11.46 *** 
(Upper) secondary education -0.10 0.01 -12.63 *** -0.09 0.01 -6.10 *** -0.07 0.01 -9.87 *** -0.12 0.01 -13.82 *** -0.06 0.00 -18.21 *** 
Post-secondary non- tertiary  -0.11 0.02 -7.04 *** -0.07 0.03 -2.74 *** -0.05 0.01 -3.31 *** -0.05 0.02 -2.97 *** -0.05 0.01 -6.69 *** 
Female  
                    
Male 0.06 0.01 8.88 *** -0.06 0.01 -5.46 *** -0.01 0.01 -1.60 NS 0.00 0.01 0.06 NS 0.01 0.00 2.57 *** 
Age>65  
                    
Age<23 -0.11 0.02 -5.58 *** -0.43 0.03 -13.04 *** -0.06 0.02 -3.26 *** -0.07 0.02 -3.72 *** -0.06 0.01 -7.72 *** 
23<Age2< 50 -0.06 0.01 -4.73 *** -0.23 0.02 -9.98 *** -0.08 0.01 -6.26 *** -0.05 0.01 -3.54 *** -0.05 0.01 -8.25 *** 
50<Age3<65 -0.01 0.01 -0.76 NS -0.08 0.02 -3.82 *** -0.06 0.01 -5.71 *** -0.03 0.01 -2.58 *** -0.02 0.00 -4.90 *** 
No Religion  
                    
Catholic -0.01 0.01 -1.76 NS 0.06 0.01 4.19 *** 0.05 0.01 7.55 *** -0.04 0.01 -4.66 *** 0.00 0.00 1.04 NS 
Protestant 0.06 0.01 5.97 *** 0.23 0.02 13.91 *** 0.17 0.01 18.43 *** 0.17 0.01 16.67 *** 0.09 0.00 21.74 *** 
Other Religions -0.09 0.01 -7.65 *** 0.06 0.02 3.20 *** 0.00 0.01 -0.14 NS -0.07 0.01 -5.54 *** -0.03 0.01 -5.95 *** 
More than 500k inh.  
                    
Between 0 and 10K inh.  0.09 0.01 7.50 *** 0.13 0.02 6.30 *** 0.01 0.01 0.93 NS -0.06 0.01 -4.78 *** 0.01 0.01 2.04 ** 
Between 10K and 100k inh.  0.10 0.01 8.25 *** 0.12 0.02 6.07 *** 0.02 0.01 1.95 NS -0.02 0.01 -1.43 NS 0.02 0.00 4.57 *** 
Between 100k and 500k inha.  0.09 0.01 7.01 *** 0.14 0.02 6.23 *** 0.04 0.01 3.20 *** -0.01 0.01 -0.71 NS 0.03 0.01 4.99 *** 
Full time  
                    
Part time 0.11 0.01 7.84 *** 0.03 0.02 1.24 NS 0.02 0.01 1.21 NS 0.07 0.01 5.11 *** 0.04 0.01 6.80 *** 
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Self-employed 0.00 0.01 0.08 NS 0.02 0.02 0.73 NS -0.08 0.01 -6.26 *** 0.02 0.01 1.18 NS -0.01 0.01 -2.26 ** 
Retired -0.01 0.01 -0.60 NS 0.05 0.02 2.26 ** -0.01 0.01 -1.26 NS -0.04 0.01 -2.90 *** -0.01 0.01 -2.10 ** 
Housewife -0.04 0.01 -2.97 *** 0.04 0.03 1.68 NS 0.00 0.01 0.25 NS -0.02 0.02 -1.24 NS -0.01 0.01 -1.63 NS 
Student 0.09 0.02 4.67 *** -0.05 0.03 -1.40 NS 0.03 0.02 1.43 NS 0.08 0.02 3.99 *** 0.04 0.01 4.66 *** 
Unemployed -0.09 0.01 -6.08 *** -0.07 0.03 -2.69 *** -0.04 0.01 -2.81 *** -0.06 0.02 -3.77 *** -0.04 0.01 -6.34 *** 
Other status -0.04 0.02 -1.96 ** 0.06 0.03 1.70 NS -0.04 0.02 -2.14 ** -0.01 0.02 -0.38 NS -0.02 0.01 -1.85 NS 
High Concern Im. Fam.  
                    
To a certain extent 0.10 0.01 9.03 *** -0.03 0.02 -1.36 NS 0.00 0.01 0.28 NS 0.03 0.01 2.84 *** 0.03 0.00 5.53 *** 
Not concerned  0.09 0.01 7.18 *** 0.06 0.02 2.77 *** 0.02 0.01 1.61 NS 0.07 0.01 5.71 *** 0.04 0.01 7.39 *** 
Family Not important  
                    
Family quite important -0.03 0.02 -1.29 NS 0.05 0.04 1.16 NS 0.06 0.02 2.89 *** 0.05 0.02 2.00 *** 0.02 0.01 1.97 ** 
Family very important 0.02 0.02 0.94 NS 0.28 0.04 7.40 *** 0.08 0.02 3.73 *** 0.01 0.02 0.41 NS 0.03 0.01 3.39 *** 
High Concern neigh.  
                    
To a certain extent -0.03 0.01 -3.94 *** 0.00 0.01 -0.11 NS -0.03 0.01 -4.24 *** -0.02 0.01 -3.02 *** -0.02 0.00 -5.40 *** 
No Concern  -0.10 0.01 -10.63 *** -0.05 0.02 -2.71 *** -0.07 0.01 -7.27 *** -0.08 0.01 -7.75 *** -0.05 0.00 -12.58 *** 
High Concern Human Kind 
                    
To a certain extent -0.01 0.01 -1.66 NS -0.06 0.01 -4.02 *** -0.02 0.01 -2.01 ** -0.03 0.01 -3.68 *** -0.01 0.00 -4.05 *** 
No Concern  -0.04 0.01 -4.09 *** -0.16 0.02 -10.75 *** -0.07 0.01 -8.30 *** -0.08 0.01 -8.48 *** -0.04 0.00 -11.55 *** 
Not simply stick own affairs  
                    
Disagree to a certain extent -0.08 0.01 -8.58 *** -0.13 0.02 -8.59 *** -0.03 0.01 -3.55 *** -0.06 0.01 -6.58 *** -0.04 0.00 -9.98 *** 
Disagree -0.10 0.01 -12.89 *** -0.10 0.01 -7.65 *** -0.03 0.01 -4.37 *** -0.13 0.01 -16.66 *** -0.06 0.00 -17.37 *** 
(Constant) 0.42 0.03 14.49 *** -0.09 0.05 -1.74 NS 0.15 0.03 5.64 *** 0.74 0.03 24.68 *** 0.21 0.01 16.62 *** 
 
 
Social Networks Social Norms Institutional Trust Trust Social Capital 
Macro Variables B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig. B StdEr t Sig. B StdEr t Sig. B StdEr t Sig. 
Social Expenditure  -0.03 0.00 -27.28 *** 0.00 0.00 -1.61 NS 0.00 0.00 2.03 ** 0.00 0.00 -0.01 NS -0.01 0.00 -11.43 *** 
Economic Development 0.00 0.00 24.08 *** 0.00 0.00 6.83 *** 0.00 0.00 6.43 *** 0.00 0.00 9.53 *** 0.00 0.00 19.83 *** 
Income Inequality -0.04 0.00 -35.77 *** 0.00 0.00 1.78 NS -0.01 0.00 -11.94 *** -0.01 0.00 -6.46 *** -0.01 0.00 -24.71 *** 
Labour Market Participation 0.00 0.00 4.89 *** 0.00 0.00 -1.60 NS 0.01 0.00 10.17 *** 0.01 0.00 10.23 *** 0.00 0.00 12.33 *** 
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  Social Networks Social Norms Institutional Trust Trust Social Capital 
Countries B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig 
Denmark                                          
France 
-0.22 0.02 -11.47 *** -0.55 0.04 -15.21 *** -0.25 0.02 -13.12 *** -0.43 0.02 -20.48 *** -0.21 0.01 -24.64 *** 
Great Britain 
-0.21 0.02 -10.22 *** -0.24 0.04 -6.20 *** -0.35 0.02 -16.80 *** -0.33 0.02 -14.25 *** -0.20 0.01 -21.30 *** 
Germany 
-0.25 0.02 -14.32 *** -0.40 0.03 -12.06 *** -0.40 0.02 -22.83 *** -0.34 0.02 -17.40 *** -0.22 0.01 -28.70 *** 
Italy 
-0.24 0.02 -11.49 *** -0.08 0.04 -2.14 ** -0.45 0.02 -21.41 *** -0.38 0.02 -16.33 *** -0.23 0.01 -24.77 *** 
Spain 
-0.40 0.02 -18.81 *** -0.37 0.04 -9.28 *** -0.30 0.02 -14.06 *** -0.35 0.02 -14.82 *** -0.23 0.01 -24.33 *** 
Netherlands 
0.40 0.02 20.58 *** -0.23 0.04 -6.36 *** -0.26 0.02 -13.49 *** -0.10 0.02 -4.80 *** -0.01 0.01 -1.33 NS 
Belgium 
-0.07 0.02 -3.42 *** -0.48 0.04 -13.28 *** -0.26 0.02 -13.33 *** -0.36 0.02 -16.78 *** -0.16 0.01 -18.97 *** 
Sweden 
-0.28 0.02 -14.79 *** -0.41 0.04 -11.39 *** -0.21 0.02 -10.76 *** -0.07 0.02 -3.03 *** -0.13 0.01 -15.52 *** 
Ireland 
-0.22 0.03 -7.94 *** -0.31 0.05 -6.06 *** -0.24 0.03 -8.75 *** -0.33 0.03 -10.80 *** -0.18 0.01 -14.45 *** 
Austria  
-0.22 0.02 -10.83 *** -0.41 0.04 -10.88 *** -0.31 0.02 -15.43 *** -0.33 0.02 -14.89 *** -0.20 0.01 -21.95 *** 
Portugal  
-0.50 0.02 -22.46 *** -0.27 0.04 -6.42 *** -0.41 0.02 -18.62 *** -0.50 0.02 -20.27 *** -0.30 0.01 -30.87 *** 
Finland 
-0.02 0.02 -1.04 NS -0.11 0.04 -3.10 *** -0.15 0.02 -7.59 *** -0.16 0.02 -7.40 *** -0.08 0.01 -8.83 *** 
Greece 
-0.41 0.02 -17.56 *** -0.62 0.04 -14.20 *** -0.50 0.02 -21.62 *** -0.48 0.03 -18.70 *** -0.32 0.01 -30.45 *** 
Poland 
-0.41 0.02 -19.53 *** -0.43 0.04 -10.91 *** -0.45 0.02 -21.25 *** -0.40 0.02 -17.05 *** -0.28 0.01 -29.76 *** 
Czech Republic  
-0.08 0.02 -4.02 *** -0.55 0.04 -14.43 *** -0.49 0.02 -24.16 *** -0.42 0.02 -18.49 *** -0.23 0.01 -25.69 *** 
Slovakia 
-0.19 0.02 -9.19 *** -0.76 0.04 -19.85 *** -0.31 0.02 -15.43 *** -0.55 0.02 -24.35 *** -0.25 0.01 -27.48 *** 
Hungary 
-0.40 0.02 -20.40 *** -0.23 0.04 -6.36 *** -0.48 0.02 -24.82 *** -0.43 0.02 -19.89 *** -0.29 0.01 -32.83 *** 
Slovenia 
0.23 0.02 10.79 *** -0.13 0.04 -3.17 *** -0.22 0.02 -10.01 *** -0.42 0.02 -17.49 *** -0.10 0.01 -10.23 *** 
Note: (1) *** Significant at the 0.01 level, ** Significant at the 0.05 level, * Significant at the 0.10 (2-tailed). 
(2) Linear regressions for Social Capital, Social Networks, Social Norms and Institutional Trust; logistic regression for Trust. 
 
1
2
/2
01
5 
 
 
5
8 
 LIEPP Working Paper nº43 
59 
Table 5A. Regressions explaining the variance of social capital and its dimensions  
  Social  Networks Social Norms Institutional Trust Trust Social Capital 
Model 2 
B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig 
Decommodification  0.06 0.00 28.80 *** 0.03 0.00 9.68 *** 0.02 0.00 10.46 *** 0.03 0.00 15.06 *** 0.02 0.00 26.99 *** 
Economic Development  
0.00 0.00 -3.31 *** 0.00 0.00 -4.20 *** 0.00 0.00 -1.65 NS 0.00 0.00 -3.66 *** 0.00 0.00 -4.68 *** 
Income Inequality  
0.06 0.00 22.27 *** 0.05 0.00 11.06 *** 0.00 0.00 -0.15 NS 0.02 0.00 7.33 *** -0.02 0.00 -15.29 *** 
Labour Market Participation  
0.02 0.00 12.97 *** 0.01 0.00 6.15 *** 0.01 0.00 5.61 *** 0.02 0.00 12.85 *** 0.01 0.00 15.97 *** 
 
  Social  Networks Social Norms Institutional Trust Trust Social Capital 
Model 3 
B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig 
Decommodification   0.05 0.00 21.95 *** 0.02 0.00 4.86 *** 0.02 0.00 11.74 *** 0.03 0.00 12.22 *** 0.02 0.00 22.45 *** 
Social Expenditure  
-0.05 0.00 -13.07 *** -0.07 0.01 -11.10 *** -0.02 0.00 -5.43 *** -0.02 0.00 -4.59 *** -0.01 0.00 -6.93 *** 
Economic Dvp. 
0.00 0.00 -11.74 *** 0.00 0.00 -10.93 *** -0.00 0.00 -2.77 *** 0.00 0.00 -5.85 *** 0.00 0.00 -8.25 *** 
Income Inequality  
0.00 0.01 0.76 NS -0.03 0.01 -3.53 *** -0.02 0.00 -4.52 *** 0.00 0.01 -0.02 NS -0.01 0.00 -2.21 ** 
Labour Market  Participation 
0.01 0.00 9.99 *** 0.01 0.00 3.66 *** 0.01 0.00 6.66 *** 0.02 0.00 11.55 *** 0.01 0.00 14.16 *** 
 
  Social  Networks Social Norms Institutional Trust Trust Social Capital 
Model 4 
B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig B StdEr t Sig 
Social Expenditure 1990s -0.08 0.00 -22.57 *** -0.08 0.01 -13.93 *** 0.00 0.00 1.10 NS -0.04 0.00 -9.89 *** -0.02 0.00 -16.25 *** 
Economic Dvp 0.00 0.00 -9.51 *** 0.00 0.00 -10.50 *** -0.00 0.00 -3.90 *** 0.00 0.00 -4.68 *** 0.00 0.00 -6.02 *** 
Income Inequality 1990s -0.07 0.00 -19.07 *** -0.06 0.01 -9.35 *** -0.02 0.00 -4.74 *** -0.05 0.00 -11.40 *** -0.03 0.00 -17.56 *** 
Labour Market Participation 1990s 0.00 0.00 2.10 ** 0.00 0.00 2.03 ** 0.00 0.00 2.53 ** 0.01 0.00 7.54 *** 0.00 0.00 6.30 *** 
Note: (1) The countries included in the analysis are: France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, Finland, and Denmark.  
(2) *** Significant at the 0.01 level, ** Significant at the 0.05 level, * Significant at the 0.10 (2-tailed). 
(3) Linear regressions for Social Capital, Social Networks, Social Norms and Institutional Trust; logistic regression for Trust. 
Source: Author's elaboration after EVS (2008); OECD (2000-2008); (Scruggs, 2004); Eurostat (2000-2008); UNU-WIDER (2000-2008).  
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Table 6A. Summary R square and number of cases (Models 1, 2, 3, 4), 2000s 
 
 
Source: Author's elaboration after EVS (2008); OECD (2000-2008); (Scruggs, 2004); Eurostat (2000-
2008); UNU-WIDER (2000-2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Social 
Network
s 
Social 
Norms 
Institutional 
Trust 
Trust 
Social 
Capital 
R square 1 .294 0.134 0.137 0.183 0.307 
Number of 
cases 
20055 20055 20055 19479 20055 
R quare 2 .204 0.121 .103 .168 0.271 
R square 3 .215 0.130 .106 0.17 0.274 
R square 4 .183 0.128 .095 .159 0.24 
Number of 
cases 
11863 11863 11863 11510 11863 
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